For decades, China’s cyber espionage centered on stealing intellectual property from the United States to bolster its own military and economy. But as its hackers grew more proficient at penetrating sensitive U.S. systems, these efforts moved beyond theft to positioning themselves to physically disrupt critical infrastructure. Last year, U.S. officials all but admitted defeat in halting China’s growing cyber arsenal when it revealed a series of hacks that left Beijing poised to disable ports, power grids, and other critical systems around the country.
A similar progression may be unfolding among China’s spy network. Much in the same way that China’s hackers graduated from stealing trade secrets to building sophisticated cyber weapons, its spies in the U.S. may be developing the skills to physically sabotage critical infrastructure during a conflict.
But there’s still time to halt its trajectory.
STEPHEN SHAVER/AFP via Getty Images
In recent years China’s U.S. spy network expanded its activities to more aggressively target dissidents within the diaspora. U.S. residents have been stalked, harassed, assaulted and had their property damaged in retaliation for speaking out against Beijing.
So-called “China repatriation squads” have secretly hunted down dissidents, pressuring them to return to China by, among other tactics, threatening or imprisoning their relatives. A former U.S. correctional officer, acting on Beijing’s behalf, burned down a sculpture in the Mojave desert depicting President Xi Jinping’s head as a coronavirus in 2021. When a former pro-democracy leader from China, now a naturalized U.S. citizen, announced a run for the House of Representatives, a Chinese intelligence operative hired someone to derail the campaign by setting the candidate up with prostitutes, assaulting him, or tampering with his car to cause a crash.
China-linked groups have also incited mob violence. During Xi’s 2023 visit to San Francisco, groups with ties to the Chinese state orchestrated coordinated assaults on anti-Beijing protesters, coming at them with flagpoles and chemical sprays, and tossing sand in their eyes.
These cases highlight China’s obsession with silencing its critics. But they also demonstrate a shift toward more violent methods and clandestine tradecraft that could be redirected toward sabotage of infrastructure targets.
Consider that U.S. investigations reveal that China has amassed a deep bench of sources and contacts, including law enforcement officers, in multiple U.S. cities who are willing to harm civilians and damage property on Beijing’s behalf.
In one case, operatives posing as art dealers interested in purchasing a work by a dissident artist secretly installed surveillance equipment in his workplace and a GPS tracker on his car. It is not hard to imagine how operatives trained in such covert surveillance could instead plant explosives, start fires, or carry out assassinations.
To be clear, there are few clear indications that China is actively planning acts of sabotage here. However, U.S. authorities have tracked dozens of incidents in which Chinese nationals, sometimes posing as tourists, attempted to access military bases and other sensitive sites. U.S. national security officials are concerned that such incidents may signal early efforts by Beijing to test security and develop plans to physically attack these locations.
The prospect of Chinese sabotage on U.S. soil should not seem far-fetched. Many of the United States’ adversaries are already at it. Russia is waging a brazen covert campaign in Europe to undermine support for Ukraine that involves attempted assassinations, arson, bombings, physical assaults and cutting underwater cables. Similarly, Iran has long pursued murder-for-hire and kidnapping plots on U.S. soil, including a recently revealed plot to assassinate Trump last fall.
Countering Chinese espionage is no easy task. While the FBI, which leads U.S. counterintelligence efforts, aggressively investigates Chinese intelligence assets, there are growing risks that some spies could slip through the cracks.
China’s strategy involves recruiting large numbers of sources with the expectation that some will not be detected. It uses students, businesspeople, and others whose legitimate covers are less likely to raise suspicion.
It’s a numbers game and China has the advantage. In 2020, the FBI reported that about half of its nearly 5,000 active counterintelligence cases were related to China. Recent news reports suggesting the bureau’s new leadership may be redirecting investigative resources from traditional priorities to immigration enforcement raises further concerns about whether the U.S. can keep pace with China’s sprawling espionage operations.
One thing is clear: China’s spy agencies are watching closely. And any sign that the U.S. is stepping back could embolden Beijing to become more aggressive with its operations on American soil.
Ian Mitch is a senior policy researcher at RAND, where his research focuses on homeland security, irregular warfare, and counterterrorism. He was previously a senior intelligence officer at the Department of Homeland Security.
The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own.
